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Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1475 (2017).

Kristin Hickman pursues a “modest” goal in Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design: “to raise a few
reservations regarding judicial refashioning of agency design via [a] severance remedy for separation of powers
violations.” This understated approach commands attention to Hickman’s analysis. In this contribution to a Notre
Dame symposium on “Administrative Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century,” Hickman clearly identifies and carefully
analyzes problems arising out of what might otherwise have passed as unremarkable applications of existing
severability doctrine. With an eye toward big-picture legitimacy of courts and agencies, and with attention toward
doctrinal and statutory detail, Hickman provides fresh reasons for judges to rethink this doctrine. And the increased
attention earned by relatively restrained criticisms like Hickman’s may eventually move the law in the direction of more
radical critiques that have started to receive an audience at the Supreme Court.
Hickman describes three cases or sets of cases in which the Supreme Court or the D.C. Circuit held an agency design
unconstitutional based on separation of powers principles and then “fixed” the problem by “severing” a structural
provision of the statutory agency design. These cases addressed the structure of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, the Copyright Royalty Board, and the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau.
The accounting oversight board was protected by two layers of for-cause removal restrictions. Board members were
removable by SEC commissioners, but only for cause; SEC commissioners were removable by the President, but also
only for cause. The Court fixed this problem by eliminating the for-cause restriction on SEC Commissioners’ ability to
remove board members.
The Copyright Royalty Board’s three Copyright Royalty Judges, who were appointed subject to removal by the
Librarian of Congress, were judicially determined to be principal rather than inferior officers. This status was owing, in
part, to a for-cause limitation on the Librarian’s authority to remove them. Because the Librarian of Congress is not
constitutionally permitted to appoint principal officers, the D.C. Circuit transformed the royalty judges into inferior
officers. The court accomplished this by eliminating the statutory for-cause limitation on the Librarian’s removal
authority.
The Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, according to a split D.C. Circuit panel, was unlawfully headed by a single
director removable only for cause, rather than by a multimember commission made up of commissioners removable
only for cause. The panel fixed this problem by eliminating the for-cause limitation on the President’s ability to remove
the Bureau’s director. The need for severance was ultimately obviated, though, when the D.C. Circuit took the panel
decision en banc and reversed on the constitutional merits. That en banc decision removed the need to determine
whether the panel’s severance move was correct.
Hickman raises three reservations about the appropriateness of severance in these three cases. First, the remedy was
not as restrained as it seems when compared with the alternative of leaving the statute operative as is but without a
functioning agency for the time it takes Congress to fix it, and when taking into account the tradeoffs reflected in the
now-invalidated agency design. Second, litigants will have less incentive to challenge agency design when the end
result makes little practical difference to the outcome of their particular cases. Third, severance of for-cause removal
restrictions renders agency actors less politically independent and thereby undercuts their perceived legitimacy.
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These criticisms are not of equal weight—the first and third are more powerful than the second. Hickman acknowledges
that a reduction in litigation incentives may not be that significant given the presence of other available actors to press
structural separation of powers arguments in challenging agency actions. She properly sees a form of “cause
lawyering” at work in the accounting oversight board case, for example.
Adding to Hickman’s points about mixed litigation incentives, one might also observe that severance in the three cases
reduced the practical costs of the underlying constitutional holding by leaving the agency’s day-to-day operations
untouched. And the Supreme Court may have been more responsive to the substantive constitutional arguments
presented by separation-of-powers “cause lawyers” precisely because of the availability of a non-disruptive fix. While
this observation limits the force of the litigation-incentives argument, it provides greater cause to be concerned about
judicial interference with the agency-design choices that Hickman discusses in connection with her other two
reservations.
A few weeks after the November 2017 symposium at which Hickman presented her paper, the Supreme Court heard
oral arguments in Murphy v. NCAA. The case had nothing to do with agency design, but the resulting opinions had
much to do with severability doctrine. After declaring a federal statute partially unconstitutional, the Court used
severability doctrine to render it totally unenforceable.
Justice Thomas took the occasion to write a powerful concurrence, one that deserves the serious and sustained
attention it will receive over time. Thomas details many ways in which the Court’s “modern severability precedents are
in tension with longstanding limits on the judicial power.” The judicial power is the power to render judgments in cases,
and what we now call “judicial review” is “a byproduct of that process.” As a consequence, “when early American
courts determined that a statute was unconstitutional, they would simply decline to enforce it in the case before them.”
Later deviations from this practice should be curbed.
If Thomas is correct, there is more reason to reject the statutory severance Hickman calls into question. The three
cases Hickman discusses exemplify what happens when the metaphor of “severability” gets away from the judges and
they mistakenly think that severance is a thing that they can do. But just as Hamilton was right in Federalist No. 78 that
the judiciary lacks the power of the sword, Justice Thomas is right that the judiciary lacks the power of the Exacto knife.
And this brings our consideration full circle to Hickman’s explanation of how things might have worked better if the
judiciary had simply followed the traditional path of setting aside the challenged agency action in these cases. The
most powerful part of Hickman’s analysis is her insistence on the obvious but overlooked fact that “declaring an
administrative agency’s structure to be unconstitutional and the agency’s actions to be inoperative” is not the same
as “invalidating a statute altogether.” Statutory prohibitions and requirements would remain in force even if there is no
enforcement agency at work. And Congress could then revive the agency by making any necessary changes. If
severance were not available, the litigants who successfully challenged the agency design would have been better off,
and the agencies would not have been judicially reconstituted in ways that risk undermining their perceived legitimacy
and that ignore legislative debates and choices.
In his Murphy concurrence, Thomas emphasized the way in which modern severability doctrine “requires courts to
weigh in on statutory provisions that no party has standing to challenge, bringing courts dangerously close to issuing
advisory opinions.” The scenario in which this worry has appeared most acutely is when a holding of inseverability
threatens the enforceability of parts of a statute not otherwise properly before the court. But the cases that Hickman
discusses reveal a different version of an advisory opinion problem. The courts purported to remove a sentence or two
from the agencies’ governing statutes—which they can only do metaphorically—while leaving “the actions of the
challenged agency, and the structures and actions of identically or similarly designed agencies, largely or entirely
untouched.”
Although Hickman does not question the fundamental legitimacy of modern severability doctrine, her analysis of its
application in a few cases shows the power of raising reservations “regarding judicial refashioning of agency design.”
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If the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit were to follow Hickman’s advice and contemplate their application of
modern severability doctrine more thoroughly, they might find their conclusions more unsettling than Hickman’s
lawyerly disclaimer of any “grand proposals” suggests.
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